Just War Theory: A Shift in Perspective by Rocha, Hermes
Pathways: A Journal of Humanistic and
Social Inquiry
Volume 1




Just War Theory: A Shift in Perspective
Hermes Rocha
University of California, Davis, hermes.rocha.101@gmail.com
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/pathways_journal/vol1/iss1/2
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Just War Theory: A Shift in Perspective
Abstract
War is an extreme human activity—not only because of the horror of war, but because of the severe
emotional, physical, psychological, and moral strain it has on its combatants. Understanding war from the
combatant’s point of view is hard enough without personally experiencing war. Without the direct experience
of combat, an epistemic gap lies between one who knows what it is like and those lucky enough not to
experience it. Consequently, the theoretical propositions of just and unjust conduct in war become difficult to
support. I argue that just war theory and its tenets such as jus in bello, or just conduct in war, needs a thorough
examination of combat experiences to define the principle with the reality of war in mind. For example, as a
precept of moral responsibility in war, jus in bello is an abstract principle which can be supported by concrete
historical examples if and only if the epistemic gap between the experience of combat and abstraction is
bridged by a consideration of the reality of war.
Keywords
just war theory, jus in bello, combatant, war is hell
Cover Page Footnote
I would like to acknowledge and thank Assistant Professor Robin M. Muller for her guidance and help with
my research. In addition, I would like to thank my mentor Assistant Professor Linda Alvarez for her constant
support that has been invaluable. Lastly, the HSI Pathways coordinator Heidi Schumacher of California State
University, Northridge for her unwavering assistance.
This journal article is available in Pathways: A Journal of Humanistic and Social Inquiry: https://repository.upenn.edu/
pathways_journal/vol1/iss1/2
  
VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1  
Published February 2019 
 
Just War Theory: A Shift in Perspective 
By Hermes Rocha, University of California, Davis  
HSI Pathways to the Professoriate, Cohort 1  
 
Abstract: ​War is an extreme human activity—not only because of the horror of war, but               
because of the severe emotional, physical, psychological, and moral strain it has on its              
combatants. Understanding war from the combatant’s point of view is hard enough without             
personally experiencing war. Without the direct experience of combat, an epistemic gap lies             
between one who knows what it is like and those lucky enough not to experience it.                
Consequently, the theoretical propositions of just and unjust conduct in war become difficult to              
support. I argue that just war theory and its tenets such as jus in bello, or just conduct in war,                    
needs a thorough examination of combat experiences to define the principle with the reality of               
war in mind. For example, as a precept of moral responsibility in war, jus in bello is an abstract                   
principle which can be supported by concrete historical examples if and only if the epistemic gap                
between the experience of combat and abstraction is bridged by a consideration of the reality of                
war. 
 
Research Keywords: ​just war theory, jus in bello, combatant, war is hell
 
The tradition of just war theory is typically acknowledged and practiced by the military, state,               
and international organizations across the world like the United Nations. Just war theory             
attempts to draw distinct principles that govern three different aspects of war: the justice of war                
(​jus ad bellum​: i.e. going to war in defense or for humanitarian intervention), just conduct during                
war (​jus in bello: ​i.e. the prohibitions of indiscriminate killing of non-combatants.), and justice              
after war (​jus post bellum​: i.e. the conduct of occupational forces). Fundamentally, these serve              
as guiding principles intended to limit the suffering caused by war. 
 
Despite the intended usefulness of contemporary just war theory, it ignores the subjective             
experience of combat. While a combatant knows what war is like and how it feels to experience                 
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it, I question whether the theorist who has no combat experience can have the same               
understanding of combat, let alone theorize about it. The difference between knowing what war              
is like and knowing about war creates a divide of knowledge and experience between the               
combatant and the theorist. I argue, then, that the subjective experience of war must be               
juxtaposed with theory. To demonstrate my argument, I will focus on combat narratives of              
veterans who served in the Pacific theater during World War II because the fight for the Pacific                 
involved battles of attrition, despite that WWII is often considered to be a contemporary example               
of a just war (Orend 31). 
 
In the Pacific, the means of combat deployed by Japanese and Allies were brutish and               
unforgiving as they frequently killed prisoners of war, civilians, and medical personnel, or, in              
other words, non-combatants. I will offer three epistemological perspectives on these means of             
combat, focusing on the impact of war on combatants. The three perspectives will explain an               
analysis behind the multi-faceted phrase ​war is hell​, which functions as an encapsulating term              
for the nature and experience of war and will show how the epistemological gap appears in just                 
war theory’s interpretation of this phrase. I base my reading of just war theory on theorist                
Michael Walzer’s ​Just and Unjust Wars ​and theorist Brian Orend’s ​The Morality of War​. I also                
consult two memoirs written by marines who fought in the Pacific during World War II: ​With the                 
Old Breed ​by Eugene B. Sledge and ​Helmet for My Pillow ​by Robert Leckie. I will then                 
demonstrate how these first-hand perspectives of combatants can be used to further develop             
principles in just war theory, or in particular ​jus in bello ​propositions like proportionality by               
offering a platform for the future study of combat behavior. 
 
1. Just War Theory and The Epistemological Gap 
With the Old Breed ​is Sledge’s personal account of the frontline experience of war. It is                
corroborated and supported by historical references and his personal notes. Sledge writes that             
“the war was a nether world of horror...[we] existed in an environment totally incomprehensible              
to men behind the lines – service troops and civilians” (121). Sledge’s words strike at the heart                 
of an epistemological problem, namely that there is a difference between “knowing what war is               
like” and knowing what it might be like. In other words, there is a difference between knowing                 
war from the first-hand perspective and knowing about war from a theoretical perspective. What              
lies in between is the epistemological gap between the combat veteran and the theorist. This               
epistemic difference requires theorists to devise propositions in abstract terms, overlooking the            
moral harm and burden of war carried by combatants. As I will argue, knowing the limits and                 
effects that combat conditions have on the psyche is crucial in understanding the limits of just                
war principles. To demonstrate this, I will illustrate an epistemic difference between theory and              
experience, by analyzing the phrase ​war is hell ​through first-hand, third-hand, and abstract             




1.1 ​War is Hell, from Without Direct Experience 
1 
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It is easy to say that ​war is hell​. However, let me clarify this phrase’s meaning by trying to                   
imaginatively place ourselves in the extreme conditions described in ​Helmet for My Pillow ​and              
With the Old Breed ​so that we can ‘observe’ these events unfold and try to understand the                 
combatant’s experience. 
 
The morning of September 15, 1944, marks the beginning of the battle of Peleliu. Consider for a                 
moment “what it must be like” for Leckie and Sledge to storm the beaches of an island five miles                   
long by two miles wide. As they are waiting in their landing crafts, incoming shells blanket the                 
island with a wall of smoke and fire. According to Leckie: “The little atoll . . . was obscured                   
beneath a pall of smoke. It was a cloud made pinkish by the light of the flames. . .” (278). As the                      
landing boats pitch and yaw with the deafening artillery shells from allied ships overhead the               
boats near the violent eruptions of the Japanese defenses. Sledge states: “Suddenly a large              
shell exploded with a terrific concussion, and a huge geyser rose up just to our right front. It                  
barely missed us” (57). The pre-invasion artillery barrage on the coral island failed to destroy the                
hidden bunkers. We will have to stretch the limits of our imagination to understand the horror as                 
they hit the beach. 
 
As they reach the shore, there is constant machine gun and artillery fire. Sledge is forced to                 
jump out the side of the craft into the violence of combat. According to Sledge: “The world was a                   
nightmare of flashes, violent explosions, and snapping bullets. Most of what I saw blurred. My               
mind was benumbed by the shock of it” (59). Like Sledge, Leckie is confronted by the same                 
ferocity: 
  
Behind me a shell landed, blowing a man clear out of his high-laced jungle boots               
. . . a marine came dashing over a sand dune in front of me, his face contorted                  
with fear, one hand clutching the other, on which the tip of his index finger had                
been shot away – the stump spouting carmine like a roman candle. (283) 
  
Leckie and Sledge along with the 1​st ​Marine Division begin to fight the enemy. However, what                
follows are the intense experiences of war. It is as Sledge describes: 
  
A wild desperate feeling of anger, frustration, and pity griped me. It was an              
emotion that always would torture my mind when I saw men trapped and was              
unable to do anything but watch as they were hit ... I had tasted the bitterest                
essence of war, the sight of helpless comrades being slaughtered, and it filled me              
with disgust. (60) 
  
The fight that Leckie and Sledge find themselves in is a constant fight for survival. What Leckie                 
and Sledge describe is the sphere of combat or the experiences contained on the battlefield.               
Left and right, their fellow comrades in arms are decimated by the Japanese small arms and                
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The descriptions of Sledge and Leckie’s experience of combat paint a grim picture of what it is                 
truly like to live through the hell of war. When we place ourselves as third-person observers of                 
their experience, the phrase ​war is hell ​sums up war’s unimaginable terrors. However, from this               
third-hand position, I cannot recreate how it must feel to witness the horrors of war, let alone                 
show us how Leckie and Sledge experience their own mortality. Thus, from the third-person              
perspective, the phrase encapsulates the experience of war that is difficult to fully grasp without               
direct experience. 
  
1.2  ​War is Hell, from Within Direct Experience 
The third-person perspective allows us to understand ​war as hell ​because “hell” acts as a               
referent to what war must be like. However, within the direct experience of war, ​war as hell                 
takes on a different meaning. I will demonstrate how Leckie’s first-hand experience of combat              
contrasts with the third-person meaning of the phrase. 
 
Leckie’s description of combat situates the hell of war somewhere beyond the scope of our first                
meaning of the phrase – recall the third-person perspective. During the Battle of the Tenaru               
River on Guadalcanal, Leckie reflects: 
  
A man says of the eruption of battle: ‘​All hell broke loose​.’ The first time he says                 
it, it is true – wonderfully descriptive. The millionth time it is said, it has been worn                 
into meaninglessness: it has gone the way of all good phrasing, it has become              
cliché. ( emphasis added​, 78) 
 
Let us examine the phrase ​all hell broke loose. ​Although there is a slight difference between the                 
phrase ​war is hell ​and ​all hell broke loose​, these phrases perform the same conceptual work.                
On the one hand, ​all hell broke loose ​refers to the onset of combat and its duration. On the other                    
hand, when one says that ​war is hell ​it means that war is to be endured. Both phrases                  
interchangeably refer to the essential nature of war – combat. I think Leckie understands that               
such a phrase misses the mark. As soon as the phrase is overused, the phrase becomes                
worthless and has no descriptive authority. Thus, Leckie places hell somewhere beyond the             
domain of suffering. 
 
Now that I have described how both phrases refer to combat, let us examine where hell resides                 
for Leckie. Leckie acknowledges that the phrase itself is an accurate depiction of battle, at first.                
However, Leckie suggests a different description of hell in war. Leckie states: 
  
Everyone was firing, every weapon was sounding voice; but this was no            
orchestration, no terribly beautiful symphony of death, as decadent rear- echelon           
observers write. Here was cacophony; here was dissonance; here was wildness;           
here was the absence of rhythm, the loss of limit . . . here was booming,                
sounding, shrieking, wailing, hissing, crashing, shaking, gibbering noise. Here         
was hell. (79) 
3 
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From Leckie’s account, combat is pure chaos. Leckie’s description of hell is everything but an               
order of sound and rhythm of an orchestrated symphony. Hell is where confusion, discord, and               
irregularity reside. Hell is the world of pandemonium and it exists in the chaotic environment of                
combat. For those without the experience of combat, hell is a descriptive term of the horrors as                 
opposed to the chaos of war. 
 
I have demonstrated that the meaning in both the term hell and the phrase ​war is hell ​has a                   
particular connotation only known by combat veterans. In contrast, the meaning behind the             
phrase ​war is hell ​from the first and third-person point of view demonstrates an epistemological               
gap. For the combat veteran, the meaning of the phrase encapsulates the chaotic nature of               
combat whereas the third-person perspective of the phrase condenses what war must be like. 
  
1.3  ​War is Hell, From the Abstract 
The previous sections clarified two different perspectives on ​war as hell​: first, the phrase              
captures the imagination of inexperienced civilians and theorists; second, the phrase has a             
particular meaning to combat veterans, e.g. the chaos of combat. The meaning of the phrase               
from an abstract point of view takes on a different significance. I wish to further examine the                 
meaning behind ​war is hell ​from a theoretical perspective. 
 
When Walzer in ​Just and Unjust Wars ​mentions ​war is hell​, it is in terms of asking “why is it                    
wrong to begin war?” In other words, what makes war criminal. Walzer’s use of the phrase                
becomes clear when he answers, in part, this particular question: 
  
We know the answer all too well. People get killed, and often in large numbers.               
War is hell​. But it is necessary to say more than that, for our ideas about war in                  
general and about the conduct of soldiers depend very much on how people get              
killed and on who those people are. (22) 
  
The context in which this phrase is used partially answers the question of what makes war a                 
crime. From Walzer’s perspective, ​war is hell ​refers to the large numbers of people who are                
killed in war. Indeed, he suggests that it is necessary to say more than just “people get killed.”                  
People are killed, but it is a question of how they are killed. Walzer is talking about ​jus in bello​,                    
or just conduct in war. Thus, Walzer is drawing a connection between the conduct of               
combatants and the criminality of war and ​war as hell​. 
 
At this point, Walzer uses this phrase in a conversation on the criminality of war and the conduct                  
of combatants as the cause, in some sense, to the hellish conditions of war. However, the                
phrase begins to take on a few other meanings. Consider Walzer’s further explanation of the               
phrase. From the abstract point of view, the phrase, or the term “hell,” has two additional                
meanings. Walzer states: “Hell is the right name for the risks they [combatants and civilians]               
never chose and the agony and death they endure...War is hell whenever men are forced to                
fight” (additions made, 27, 28). War is “hell” for combatants and civilians that are forced to suffer                 
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and endure war. The way in which the phrase is used above is an extension of the criminality of                   
war, since the distinction of “the forcing others to endure hell,” is what Walzer and other                
theorists like Carl von Clausewitz refer to as the tyranny of war. The tyranny of war refers to the                   
indiscriminate nature of war; that is, even though you may not have an interest in war, it might                  
find its way into your life, much like when a peaceful town with no affiliation with either side of a                    
conflict is interrupted by war. However, Walzer’s particular meaning of hell adds another             
distinction. Walzer states: “When we say, war is hell, it is the ​victims ​of the fighting that we have                   
in mind” (​emphasis added​, 30). The victims of combat are typically civilians and soldiers alike;               
unfortunately, it seems that civilians are victims more often. 
2. The Gap between Perspectives 
At this juncture, the abstract meaning of the phrase in question has three parts: 1) it refers to the                   
criminality of war and the conduct of combatants, 2) it refers to those who are forced to                 
fight/endure the hardships of war, regardless if they were drafted into such a position or if they                 
willingly volunteered, and 3) the victims of the fighting – combatants and non-combatants alike. 
 
What makes Walzer’s interpretation of the phrase problematic is when the epistemological gap             
appears in terms of the victims of war. Walzer clarifies a difference between agents and victims                
of war, although they can sometimes be the same person. For instance, Walzer suggests that               
combatants are not entirely forced to random acts of violence (40). Unless a combatant finds               
themselves in the most extreme circumstances, he is still responsible for his actions. From a               
conceptual perspective, Leckie and Sledge and others like them are agents of warfare.             
However, in doing so they also have become victims by Walzer’s standard since they are forced                
to endure the hardships inflicted on them by the Japanese aggressors. Thus, from the              
theoretical perspective, Leckie’s and Sledge’s agency enables them to make war hellish and             
experience it as so. However, for those who have chosen to serve, it is not hell that makes them                   
victims but the feeling of expendability. This sentiment is a feeling known to combatants who               
have been disregarded by their commanders or fallen victim to the fog of war. The key                
difference is that the feeling of expendability and victimhood is only a possibility when one is in                 
combat. I fear that the epistemological gap in just war theory runs the risk of extending this                 
sentiment. 
 
From Leckie’s point of view, to be seen as a victim of the war robs the soldier of a                   
choice—self-sacrifice. Leckie’s realization that he and his comrades were, at times, expendable            
made the war worse. This sense of victimhood is missing from Walzer’s just war theory, but it is                  
known to men like Leckie. For example, Leckie says: “Being expended robs you of the exultation,                
the self-abnegation, the absolute freedom of self-sacrifice. Being expended puts one in the role              
of ​victim ​rather than sacrificer, and there is always something begrudging in this” (​emphasis              
added​, 96). This feeling is so detrimental that, according to Leckie: “Hunger, the jungle, the               
Japanese, not one or all these could be quite as corrosive as the feeling of expendability. This                 
was no feeling of dedication but absolutely involuntary” (96). In other words, Leckie believes that               
the feeling of expendability is forced when men are treated as mere tools of war. 
5 
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Walzer and Leckie are making different points in terms of victimhood. Leckie’s experience of              
victimhood is based in the feeling of expendability (Leckie, 96), e.g. when soldiers are treated as                
tools of war, whereas Walzer’s distinction is based on the meaning behind the phrase ​war is hell                 
(Walzer, 30), that is the condition of hell when one speaks of war. Nonetheless, the difference                
between victimhood in just war theory and victimhood in the experience of war is self- sacrifice.                
From the veteran’s point of view, self-sacrifice is linked to the bonds forged in combat, which are                 
typically known to veterans. For the theorist without experience of this bond, this relationship              
and the choice of self-sacrifice is another epistemological obstacle. 
 
In Sledge’s view, the war had few positive outcomes, one of them being the loyalty and trust the                  
Marines gained for one another: “Combat leaves an indelible mark on those who are forced to                
endure it. The only redeeming factors were my comrades’ incredible bravery and their devotion              
to each other” (315). There is truth to Sledge’s words about the brotherhood among men in                
combat. These bonds were so powerful that men who had returned home, feeling unable to               
re-assimilate to civilian life, re-enlisted (Sledge 266). This illuminates the difference between            
combat experience and civilian life. Sledge reflects, “the folks back home didn’t, and in              
retrospect couldn’t have been expected to, understand what we had experienced, what in our              
minds seemed to set us apart forever from anyone who hadn’t been in combat” (276). According                
to Sledge, combat changes a person so much so that a veteran is distinct from a civilian. What                  
is important to take away here is that if combat veterans feel estranged from their civilian                
counterparts, they could feel just as alienated by theorists who have no combat experience. The               
epistemological difference and characteristics of the experience of war that cannot be fully             
appreciated—except, possibly, on a superficial level—by the theorist and civilian. However, it            
also seems troublesome to think that the feelings of expendability and the depreciation of the               
relationships formed in combat are compounded by just war theory when considering the moral              
status of combatants. 
 
A major concern in just war theory is the moral status of combatants as well as the human rights                   
reserved for them like the right to fair and safe treatment as prisoners of war. When discussions                 
about the rights and moral status of combatants take place, theorists run the risk of contributing                
to the feelings of expendability and further separating the opportunity to fully understand the              
relationships formed in combat. According to just war theorist Orend and author of ​The Morality               
of War​, Walzer’s just war theory presents an alarming suggestion that I would interpret as a                
form of conceptual expendability. Orend states: 
  
One of the murkiest areas of Walzer’s just war theory concerns the moral status of ordinary                
soldiers. His references to them exhibit, on the one hand, a humane sympathy for their “shared                
servitude” as “the pawns of war.” On the other, his references occasionally displace something              
like a glib callousness, as when he concurs with Napoleon’s (in)famous remark that “soldiers are               
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To think that soldiers, in one sense or another, are expendable, or “made to be killed,”                
complicates the overall concern of just war theory itself. In all fairness, it seems likely that                
Walzer is referring to the tendency for aggressors to view soldiers as pawns of war. The                
unfortunate reality is that the criminality of war makes the innocent suffer, even those who are                
forced, or choose, to fight. Thus, Walzer argues: “Any rule that limits the intensity and duration                
of combat or the suffering of soldiers is to be welcomed, but none of these restraints seem                 
crucial to the idea of war as a moral condition” (42). Yet, Walzer’s view is perplexing given the                  
goal ​of just war theory. It may be that Walzer is correct that the limitations placed on waging war                   
can change due to technological advances and social transformation (42), but it is antithetical to               
just war theory to assume that these limits are not critical to the moral conditions of war. As a                   
matter of fact, Walzer’s perspective increases the possibility of extending the feeling of             
expendability and victimhood to combatants. This contributes to the epistemological gap           
between the abstract principles of just war theory and the reality of war. 
 
The section above has clarified the different points of view regarding the phrase ​war is hell​,                
victimhood, self-sacrifice, and the moral status and expendability of combatants. I have argued             
that there is a difference between how one experiences combat and our abstractions of what               
those experiences must be like. Consequently, these abstractions alter how we theorize about             
the justice of war. 
  
3. The Future of Just War Theory: ​Proportionality and Combat Behavior ​In my final analysis               
of contemporary just war theory, I argue that the epistemic gap can be mitigated by consulting                
combat behavior. Consider the Japanese behavior towards allied troops during World War II             
which were brutal and extreme that allied troops distrusted wounded enemy soldiers, despite             
the fact that the wounded enemy soldiers reserved the right to be treated as non-combatants.               
For instance, after clearing a bunker, Sledge says, “while the rest of us looked over the fallen                 
Japanese to be sure none was still alive; wounded Japanese invariably exploded grenades             
when approached, if possible, killing their enemies along with themselves” (118). It was a              
common practice for wounded Japanese soldiers to commit suicide with grenades while            
receiving aid from the Marines. With these possibilities always in play, one could only expect the                
feelings and attitudes of combatants changing to a degree that the enemy has forfeited any               
rights. In fact, Sledge notes these changes in feelings after witnessing something horrifying that              
his thoughts towards the Japanese altered: 
 
The bodies were badly decomposed and nearly blackened by exposure... One           
man had been decapitated. His head lay on his chest; his hands had been              
severed from his wrists and also lay on his chest near his chin. In disbelief, I                
stared at the face as I realized that the Japanese had cut off the dead Marine’s                
penis and stuffed it into his mouth. The corpse next to him had been treated               
similarly. The third had been butchered, chopped up like a carcass torn by some              
predatory animal. My emotions solidified into rage and a hatred for the Japanese             
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beyond anything I ever had experienced. From that moment on I never felt the              
least pity or compassion for them no matter what the circumstances. (148) 
 
Examples like the one above illustrate how combat behavior changes how combatants feel             
towards the enemy. It only seems natural to develop hatred for one’s enemy. However, there is                
a drastic difference between understanding who the enemy is and truly hating him. The study of                
combat behavior will allow just war theorists to delineate where just war principles fail and               
succeed. For example, in normal warfare, the principles of ​jus in bello ​might suffice, but in total                 
warfare, like Sledge’s experiences in WWII, the ​jus in bell​o principles like proportionality are              
pushed against extreme limits. 
 
Proportionality is a ​jus in bello ​concept that argues soldiers and nations should respond to force                
with equal measures; in other words, if a nation is attacked by standard weapons, they should                
not respond with nuclear arms. According to proportionality in the circumstance above, the             
wounded Japanese soldiers broke the ​jus in bello ​principle by committing suicide and in              
consequence maiming or killing Marines. Yet it is Sledge and his buddies who are subject to the                 
moral burden of restraining themselves from operating with the same senseless violence. Keep             
in mind that similar but less extreme callous behavior has been reported towards the Japanese.               
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the dichotomy of restraint. This relationship offers a              
platform for expansion in just war theory. 
 
Walzer is skeptical of studying combat behavior. According to Walzer: “We cannot get at the               
substance of the [war] convention by studying combat behavior, any more than we can              
understand the norms of friendship by studying the ways friends actually treat one another” (44).               
To clarify, the “war convention,” is a collection of various principles that influence our judgments               
about conduct during war. I would consider the possibility that most of these precepts alter the                
way in which one views the nature of combat which, consequently, broadens the             
epistemological gap in just war theory. Walzer is saying that we cannot analyze the spoken or                
unspoken agreements combatants have between one another. That is to say that we cannot              
closely analyze the developed conventions between combatants any more than one can study             
human relationships. Consider how Japanese soldiers often treated captured Marines. Walzer is            
correct that there is some unspoken agreement between combatants in this case. Yet these              
circumstances fail to account for why soldiers commit such levels of inhumanity. Just war theory               
is a framework based on the limitations and justifications about how combatants should treat              
each other and how they should treat non-combatants. If just war theory’s framework does not               
explain, in part, why combatants treat one another in such inhumane ways, then how is just war                 
theory’s framework able to explain why it is wrong to meet such brutality without proportional               
response? The ​jus in bello ​precept of proportionality requires Sledge and his fellow combatants              
to restrain from the same acts of violence perpetrated by Japanese combatants. In fact, they are                
required to treat enemy prisoners humanely according to just war theory. Although men like              
Sledge and Leckie were very much aware of the mistreatment of their fellow captured Marines,               
how do we expect them to restrain themselves in conditions that seem so overwhelming that is                
likely to cause men to buckle under the weight of extreme combat fatigue? The future of just war                  
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theory depends on the modification of its shortcomings to answer such questions. First-hand             
accounts can help theorists understand where reality and abstraction lie as well as how can               
reality inform abstraction. Therefore, the study of combat behavior is essential to the growth of               
just war theory and is necessary to narrow the epistemological gap. 
 
Conclusion 
To fully understand in detail what war is like is difficult. With that said, just war theorists must                  
understand what war is like in order to move just war theory forward. For the men and women                  
who serve in the armed forces and experience combat, war is a matter of life and death.                 
Judgments made in war, either strategic or personal, have dire consequences. The rules and              
principles that just war theorists propose often translate into rules of engagement that affect              
combatants and civilians. Therefore, I argue that it is important to recognize that there is an                
epistemological gap between the theorist who has no war experience and the combat veteran. 
 
In order to demonstrate that this epistemic gap exists, I have revealed the different senses of                
the phrase ​war is hell​. From the third-person perspective, ​war is hell ​because it is the closest                 
conceptual reference one has to the nature of war; thus, ​hell ​is the representative term that                
indicates the conditions in which combatants have to suffer. From the first-person account, war,              
in and of itself, is an inherently difficult feeling to describe to those who are not combat veterans.                  
Leckie says that the phrase ​all hell broke loose ​has become a cliché́ and that hell resides in the                   
chaos of combat. While Sledge claims that “the war was a netherworld of horror” in which                
civilians and rear echelon troops could not comprehend (121). Finally, war considered in the              
abstract further widens the epistemic gap because it runs the risk of extending certain forms of                
conceptual expendability. Thus, just war theorists must avoid propositions that view combatants            
as expendable assets or victims, especially to those who choose to serve in combat. Lastly and                
most importantly, the limits on war introduced by just war theory should depend on war as a                 
moral condition. Otherwise, what is the point of just war theory? 
 
The doctrine of just war theory is the foundation upon which one judges the conduct and                
reasons for going to war (Walzer 44). However, those who are tasked with waging war are the                 
ones who bear the moral affliction of combat. Given that combatants know what war is like, it                 
makes sense to heed their words in order to gain insight into the experience of war and to                  
determine what makes war just. It will be possible to narrow the epistemic gap if one adheres to                  
the veteran’s experience. The task of narrowing the divide should help in reconstructing the              
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